This is the most extensive and comprehensive professional military analysis of Syria’s air defense capabilities you will find these days, extracted directly from the Russian military magazine “topwar” READ ON MAN INSTEAD OF BEING RETARDED WITH YOUR ANIME

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This is the most extensive and comprehensive professional military analysis of Syria’s air defense capabilities you will find these days, extracted directly from the Russian military magazine “topwar” READ ON MAN INSTEAD OF BEING RETARDED WITH YOUR ANIME

Post  yumekichi11 on Thu Aug 29, 2013 6:13 pm

This is the most extensive and comprehensive professional military analysis of Syria’s air defense capabilities you will find these days, extracted directly from the Russian military magazine “topwar”. Since Russia manufactured this massive array of air defense batteries deployed in Syria, they should know what they are talking about. We hope this will be useful to military minded readers as well as to anyone who would like to expand his education on military hardware and its implications for the battle field (more specifically for the upcoming international crisis in Syria)


(English Translation by Google translate)

For over a year the world’s attention focused on the Middle East region, where once again the fate of many people of Muslim countries. A new object of the immediate interests of the U.S. government and its allies in NATO was displeasing to the West with Syria regime of Bashar al-Assad. The country is teetering on the verge of real civil war with numerous human and material losses. Civilians are killed, the opposing sides, as usual, one-to blame for it on each other. Opposition groups, supported by the West, get organized structure, unified management, receiving support arms, ammunition, food, etc. from Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, as land and air borders of Syria almost open. Government troops hold the cities and large towns, while the opposition controls about half of the country, including most of the countryside.

Preservation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria is an important geopolitical significance. The stability and strength of Syria is extremely important for Russia, which seeks to maintain its influence in the Middle East region. It is clear that the military intervention of the West and the overthrow of the legitimate government of Syria to open direct path of aggression against Iran, which, ultimately, will present a threat to Russia itself.Syria’s geopolitical situation is extremely unflattering. The country is in a hostile environment: from the south – Israel, Lebanon blazing in the east – unstable Palestine, Iraq, north – hostile to Turkey. Syria’s military doctrine is based on the principle of defense sufficiency, which is determined by the development of the armed forces. The main opponent of Damascus sees Israel, not excluding the threat of military conflict with Iraq and Turkey.Syria Sun developed on the basis of these objectives, and today are among the strongest in the Armed Forces of the Arab world.

Powerful Army (3 army corps, 12 divisions, 7 of them – tank, 12 brigades, 10 regiments of the Special Forces, Independent Tank Regiment) in dire need of cover-up by air strikes. Aviation combat capabilities of Israel and Turkey on the order beyond the capacity of Syrian Air Force. Undoubtedly, Syria, like any country, is unable to stand up to the combined group of NATO coalition air force in the event of their air operations. So the Syrians have long been concerned about the development of defense systems, acquiring modern air defense systems in Russia, Belarus, China. According to experts, the defense of Syria today are quite formidable. Destroying 22 June 2012 Syrian air defenses Turkish spy plane clearly confirms this. According to many political analysts, downed “Phantom” was almost a guarantee to prevent the upcoming NATO military intervention, hastening to help the opposition.The effectiveness of the Syrian air defense is not put to any comparison with Libya’s air defenses, which could not in any way oppose the modern grouping of NATO Air Forces. ’s look more closely at the state of the heroic defense, consider some of the design features of its components will try to give an objective assessment of the combat capabilities of the guarantor of the sovereignty and the preservation of the Syrian state.

What is in the arsenal of the air defense forces of Syria?

Armed with Syria’s air defense forces are anti-aircraft missile and artillery systems and complexes, both modern and old types, the last Arab-Israeli war of 40 years ago. At the time, a truly invaluable assistance ($ 13.4 billion of debt remained unpaid!) In the supply of weapons, training of personnel the country had the Soviet Union, so virtually all the weapons (not just anti-aircraft) has a Soviet and Russian origin. Today, in the defense of Syria, there are about 900 pieces of SAM and more than 4,000 anti-aircraft guns of various modifications. The greatest reach in range are the S-200 “Angara” and C-200B “Vega” (50 CP), C-75 “Dvina”, C-75M “Volga”. Extreme concern Israel cause modern medium-range air defense missile systems – S-300 earlier modifications (48 SAM), which in late 2011, allegedly put Russia (according to other sources – Belarus and China). The greatest representation in the Syrian air defense system have SAM and medium-range air defense missile systems, some of which are modern systems “Buk-M1-2″, “Buk-M2E (36 SDA 12 ROM), as well as the legacy SAM C-125″ Neva “, C -125M “Pechora” (CP 140), 200 SPU “Cube” (“Square”), 14 SAM batteries “Wasp” (60 MB). In addition, in 2006, was awarded a contract to supply Syria’s 50 most advanced ZRPK “Armour-S1E,” part of which is already in service. In the ground forces are PU air defense system “Strela-1″ BM “Strela-10″ (35 units), MANPADS 4000 “Strela-2/2M)”, “Strela-3″, more than 2,000 anti-aircraft artillery systems ZU-23 2, ZSU-23-4 “Shilka” (400 units). On the long-term storage are anti-aircraft artillery caliber 37 mm and 57 mm, and 100 mm gun KS-19. As we can see, the bulk of SAM and SAM systems (about 80%) is represented by outdated models of AME. However, all the systems in the past years have been (or are being) deep modernization and to some extent to meet modern needs. radar reconnaissance radars are P-12, P-14, P-15, P-30, P-35 , P-80, radio altimeters PRV-13, PRV-16, the ideology of development which originates from the second half of the last century. This technique 30-40 years ago in the Arab-Israeli wars could still somehow resist the then enemy air, using existing modes of detuning from the various types of interference, change the operating frequency, etc.

Today these samples, first developed a technical resource in Second, hopelessly behind on the capabilities of potential enemy Application “electronic beats.” In the best case, the group may use these defense radar in peacetime in combat duty in order to detect the intruder, opening the beginning of enemy air attack (IOS), air traffic control, etc. In order for the air defense system to work effectively, it is necessary that all its components fulfill their functional purpose, contributing to the objectives of defense. To judge the power of the air defense system in fact defeat a downed aircraft in peacetime, the offending state border is impossible. The decor in the fighting will be quite different. The massive use of small air targets – WTO members (such as drones, cruise missiles, UAB, guided missiles, etc.), the use of intensive fire and electronic countermeasures against anti-aircraft fire, disabling the control and intelligence, the widespread use of false and distracting goals – in such an incredibly difficult conditions will operate an air defense system. Reflection of modern beats SVN combined in a complex highly organized system, is possible only when adequate contrast to her high air defense system. Here, of particular importance and capabilities of the state and control, reconnaissance aircraft and alerting the enemy of him, carefully organized and built anti-aircraft missile systems and artillery cover (ZRAP), as well as fighter-air cover (IAP).

Command and Control Systems

The control system of troops fighting Syrian air defenses built by the usual classical scheme that combines management and staffs of air defense zones (North and South), command posts (control points) anti-aircraft missile (artillery) units, units and units of radio units. The communication system is a traditional channels tropospheric relay, short-wave radio, is also widely used wired connection.

For command and control of air defense has three fully computerized command posts. They allow you to start a fight to provide air defense operation of controls in the organization of defense, planning combat operations and to exchange operational and tactical information. The possibilities of automated management fighting all the air defense group is very low due to a number of reasons. Firstly, the extremely low level of equipment of Air Defense Forces with modern means of automation. Anti-air battle management system is a sample from the ACS air defense systems and systems, and the old park. For example, for the control of S-75, S-125 and S-200 are used AIMS ASURK-1M (1MA), “Vector-2″, “diamond”, “Senezh-M1E”, “Proton”, “Baikal”, which were taken into service in the middle of the last century. Ideology battle management of air defense systems, implemented in these tools, to the contemporary world does not suit is hopelessly outdated. Samples available ASU allows an automated way to solve the problem of collecting, processing, display and transmission of radar information with respect to certain CP homogeneous air defense units (divisions, regiments, brigades).

Centralized management of mixed groups fighting in areas like defense, and in the unions is not implemented due to lack of information system means to address these challenges. On the one hand, we know that the decentralization of control significantly reduces the overall efficiency of the air defense system due to the lack of interaction, omissions air targets , undue concentration of fire, etc. While on the other hand, in the reflection of shock EHV high density in strong (overwhelming) interference, a powerful enemy fire independent actions of anti-aircraft fire may be the only effective way to solve the problems of air defense. The development of detailed guidelines to fight the fire and to conduct interaction with the distribution of space charge between firing units in the group and between groups can significantly bring efficiency air defense system to potentially possible. Under these conditions, the decentralized management may be preferred. A striking example of the inadequacy of excessive centralization of management is unpunished landing on Red Square light aircraft that had taken place 25 years ago, which went through a fairly strong defense group in the west of the USSR, Moscow’s useless to expect from the team on the discovery of fire and the defeat of the detected and followed her aerial target. Vo- Second, far from satisfactory state of affairs with ASU fighting not only for the CP (CP) groups of air defense, but also in the air defense assets. For example, the battery commander’s point PU-12 air defense system “Osa” automated solves only a narrow range of tasks and maintain ties tracks according to their own radar, radar coordinate conversion from the “digital” source. Moreover, target designation to combat vehicles must issue a non-automated way, the voice of the issuance of target coordinates, which also reduces the effectiveness of management. Given the fact that the complexes “Wasp” currently cover the brigade S-200, for the destruction of which could be used cruise missiles, ASD, and other small-sized, high-speed targets, the use of IP-12 in conditions of extreme shortage of time becomes almost useless.

To control the SAM “Square” is used to control complex-1 (“Crab”), created in 1957-1960. The system allows on-site and in the movement clearly displayed on the remote commander of the brigade traffic situation on information from the radar matched the old park. Operators have to manually simultaneously process up to 10 targets, issue by targeting them with forced-guided stations antennas pointing. To detect enemy aircraft and target designation on Division with the purpose of distribution and transport of the fire he needs 25-30 with that in conducting modern fast-moving anti-aircraft combat prohibitively long. Range of the radio link is limited and is only 15-20 km. possess a higher possibility of an automated fire control system and advanced air defense missile systems Buk-M2E air defense missile systems S-300 and the “Shell-S1E” (if they are delivered fully assembled with command and control points). In these tools, an automated information system solved the problem of decision-making at the reflection of shock IOS (firing), setting fire tasks, monitor their implementation, control the flow of missiles (ammunition), the organization of interaction, documenting military operations, etc. However, along with high the level of automation of the fire control of the constituent elements of the complex remains the problem of interaction with the external air defenses. With such a diversity of mixed air defense group to the forefront the problem of organizing a centralized automated management.

Thirdly, the problem is aggravated by the inability of technical information and the interaction of various AIMS. The collection and processing of radar data with all this equipment ACS can only be non-automated with the use of tablets. Radar data obtained using radar type P-12, P-14, P-15, P-30, P-35, P-80 and 13 PRV-PRV-16 (and possibly a new radar park) can be processed and used with the use of automated posts radar data processing (PORI-1 PORI-2), but information about their presence in Syria is not available. As a result, the system intelligence and alerts on air opponent will function with large delay of radar data. Thus, under intense fire and electronic countermeasures centralized management of air defense equipment for its outdated models of ACS will undoubtedly be lost, which will reduce the potential for grouping destroy air targets.

Radio equipment

Combat use of radio groups of troops (PTB) Syria has a number of special features. It is quite obvious the increased role of radio engineering troops in air defense system in the armed conflicts of recent decades, the effectiveness of which depends mainly on the quality of management, and hence the success of the anti-aircraft and unmanned enemy. However, one of the weaknesses of the Syrian air defenses – radio engineering troops equipped with outdated, completely exhausted operating radar. About 50% of the radar available in service radio companies, battalions and brigades, in need of major repair, 20-30% – non-operational. Radars II-12, P-14, P-15, P-30, P-35, P-80 well known American military professionals and their colleagues from NATO on Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli wars and the wars in the Persian Gulf.

At the same time, the development and operational use of the western SVN the last few decades, there was a significant qualitative leap. It is clear that the Syrian (read more Soviet) means RTV unable to effectively deal with the modern means of air attack for several reasons: 1. Low immunity group RTV. Samples radar projected in the middle of the last century, as well as created on the basis of their group PTB were able to fulfill combat tasks in the application of active noise interference of low intensity (up to 5.10 W / MHz), and the private sector (in some areas ) – in applying active noise interference medium intensity (30-40 W / MHz). In operation 2003 “Shock and Awe” against Iraq forces and coalition EW equipment, NATO created the interference density is two orders higher – up to 3.2 kW / MHz in barrage mode and up to 30-75 kW / MHz – Rifle Sight. Thus RES RTV and S-75 and S-125 are in service with Iraqi air defenses were suppressed by 10-25 W / MHz. 2. Low level of automation command and control radar reconnaissance. Available in the RTV Syrian radar reconnaissance unable to function in a single information space for lack of a unified automated information center for information. Statistical non-automated way to lead to large inaccuracies, delays in data transmission on the air for 4-10 minutes. 3. Inability to create a radar field with the required parameters. Fragmentary radar field allows to evaluate a private traffic situation and act upon individual decisions on the conduct of hostilities.

When you create a group of PTB to consider the geographical features of the area upcoming fighting, its limited size, the presence of large areas of uncontrolled group of radio engineering troops airspace. Mountain areas are hardly suitable for the deployment of units RTV, because the creation of a continuous radar field is extremely problematic. Room for maneuver units and parts RTV also extremely limited. complex terrain features allow you to create a tri-band radar field with the following parameters: - height of the lower boundary of the continuous radar field: over the territory of Syria, in the coastal area and through a divorce forces with Israel – 500 m on border with Lebanon – 500m, over the territory of Lebanon – 2000 m - on the border with Turkey – 1000 – 3000 m, on the border with Iraq – 3000 m - the height of the upper boundary of the continuous radar field over the territory of Syria – 25,000 m - the depth of the radar field (removing borders detection) for the Syrian-Israeli border may be 50 – 150 km; - overlapping radar field – two or three times; - at altitudes of 100-200 m radar field is only the focal character in almost all important ways. course, increase efficiency RTV Syria group promotes modernization pursued by the armament of obsolete Soviet-made radar. Thus, in early 2012 have been upgraded Russian radar deployed on the mountain Jabal al-Harrah south of Damascus, the Syrian radar station in Lebanon located on Mount Sanin. This led to an opportunity to receive information warning of possible air attacks by Israel.However, the solution is to radically re-RTV effective modern radar. In part, this occurs when the supply of air defense missile systems and complexes systems, which are available in the modern radar with high energy and noise immunity.

Given the nature of RTV equipment, terrain, the experience of combat employment of reconnaissance air attacks Syria, we can offer a number of key organizational and tactical recommendations.The structure of radar reconnaissance units appropriate to introduce a standard component order of battle corner reflectors and radar simulators radiation stations (IRIS), a portable type. Corner reflectors installed on false and combat (spare) positions in groups or singly at the distance of 300 m from the radar (Surnov, SOC BM). Portable IRIS installed at a distance of a few hundred meters to several kilometers away from the antenna post or Surnov SAM. use radar, the disabled, but with a working transmission systems as false (distractions). The deployment of the radar carry on fighting positions at a distance of 300-500 m from the command points (control points), the inclusion of the radiation from the start to carry out the raid SVN enemy. All Party (CP) and on the directions of the probable enemy action EHV up a network of air monitoring stations, equipping them with the means of observation, communication, and data transfer.

For early warning of the spans SVN organize special operative channels sensitive information. important elements to enhance the stealth enemy air reconnaissance system has a set of organizational activities. At each position of the radar should be carefully masking and engineering equipment immediately after deployment. Trenches to divert intelligence stations in such a way that the lower emitter antenna was located on the ground level. All cable management should be carefully nestled in a depth of 30-60 cm Beside each should be equipped with radar and slit trenches for shelter personnel. The change of position of radar reconnaissance units performed immediately after the span of reconnaissance aircraft, after work on radiation, even for a short time, while on a position for more than four hours. To reduce radar visibility in the visible and infrared spectrum with the background to carry out the cloaking and distorting coloration, create false thermal targets of available tools (a campfire, lighting torches, etc.). False heat targets should be placed on the ground for the real distance, the distance between the elements of the military orders. It is advisable to use false thermal targets in conjunction with the corner reflectors, covering them with camouflage nets.

n terms of enemy radar WTO to create a field duty and military regimes. Duty radar field created on the basis of the radar standby meter band waves that roll out on time positions. Radar field of combat mode to create covert based on modern combat mode radar from the coming into service AAMS (SAM). On the directions to create a missile-warning stripes on the basis of low-altitude radar and visual observation posts. When selecting products for their deployment to seek to close the corners in sectors likely detect cruise missiles did not exceed 4-6 minutes. Scouting enemy aircraft before Activism SVN lead locators mainly meter wavelength range from temporary positions.

Turning off these radars and maneuver on reserve positions immediately following the inclusion of combat mode radar in combat positions. To organize the defense radar shock anti-radar missiles (PRR) in the units of radar reconnaissance necessary to carry out the following activities: - purposefully provide psychological training of personnel and the training of military calculations in a combat operation in the application of the opponent PRR; - to conduct early and thorough analysis of expected trends, areas hidden exit routes carriers PRR to the borders of missile launches; - to carry out timely autopsy started hitting enemy aircraft and detection approach its aircraft carriers to the borders start PRR; - implement strict regulation of RES in the radiation (mainly apply meter band radar waves and the PDF for the detection and tracking of targets) - on the stage of the organization fighting to carry the maximum frequency spacing similar to the RES units, establish periodic maneuver frequencies; - immediately turn off the radars and UHF wave starts after the RDP. These and a number of other activities, of course, known to combat radar calculations, we study the experience of fighting and preparing for modern war. Despite the apparent simplicity and accessibility, their conduct, in practice, can significantly improve the survival of elements of the enemy reconnaissance aircraft in heavy fire and electronic countermeasures.

Potential is there, but it is insufficient

quantities available SAM and SAM systems, as well as numerous anti-aircraft artillery systems System anti-aircraft missile and artillery cover (ZRAP) Syrian air defenses capable of creating a sufficiently high density of fire over the main objects of the country and the army group. presence in the air defense system of different types of air defense missile systems, air defense missile systems and ZAC allows you to build a multi-layer system of anti-aircraft fire at a concentration of their efforts to cover-up the most important sites . Thus, the S-200 will destroy the most important targets at ranges of 140 – 150 km from the borders of the sea coast, at distances up to 100 km from the large industrial centers and in the mountainous areas of the territory adjacent to Lebanon and Turkey. Of S-75, S-300 have a reach of up to 50-70 km above the hide behind objects (including angles close and interference). Fire power of modern SAMs and air defense missile systems “Buk-M1-2, 2E” and “Shell-S1E” provide a high density of fire at medium altitudes and distances up to 20-25 km. Complements ZRAP at low and extremely low altitudes fire numerous types of ZAC “Shilka”, C-60, KC-19. Analysis of the fire indicates that between North and South zones of Syria’s air defense is a failure in the integrated area of destruction, especially in the extreme small, small and medium altitudes.

The gap at the affected area and covered two or three S-200 from each zone, however, is probably the position of their starting positions have long been explored and known to the enemy. Since the beginning of active hostilities according to the starting position in the first place would be dealt cruise missile strikes, so it is suitable for this area in Northern and Southern factions defense contain razed reserve the S-300P air defense system “Buk-M2E” to restore the broken lamp system. In addition, there is a hidden approach from the north-west direction at extremely low and low-altitude air defense in the Northern Zone, covered the three divisions C-200, with three battalions of S-75 and two battalions of S-125, the positions of which are also, of course, been explored. For these positions with the beginning of active operations of enemy air strikes would be dealt with cruise missiles, RES, SAM will be subject to jamming from which these types of complexes in fact are not protected. In this case, in this area should be kept in a hidden reserve of S-300P, Buk-M2E air defense missile systems to strengthen the system of fire and its recovery.

To reflect the impact SVN with Ar-Rakanskogo (north), Al-Khasan (north-east), Daur -Azzavrskogo areas that remain uncovered in the overall air defense system, it is advisable to organize a group for the actions of air defense ambushes and as a nomadic. These groups should be included air defense system “Buk-M2E” ZRPK “Armour-S1E” MANPADS, 23-mm and 57-mm anti-aircraft guns. preliminary, superficial evaluation of the fire shows that the main efforts are focused on air defense cover for the two directions south-west (the border with Lebanon and Israel), and the north-west (the border with Turkey). The strongest “umbrella” defense created over the cities of Damascus, Hama, Idlib, Aleppo (capital, large industrial and administrative centers.) In addition, these cities are the main airbases both civil and military aircraft, as well as the locus of major factions of the government troops. On the positive side, long-range air defense system that covered the main area of the country, with the removal of the affected area is provided by far the approaches to the main administrative and industrial centers, sea ports, airfields, troop groupings. The exception is the overt plot area in the northeast of Syria’s border with Iraq.

Stationary system ZRAP is the basis for covering groups of the Army, which is complemented by anti-aircraft fire barrel of mobile air defense systems. As already noted, these funds in regular structures of the tank (mechanized) divisions and brigades have up to 4,000 units (alone ZSU “Shilka” There are about 400). These tools are effective in the fight against low-flying aircraft, helicopters, mobile, portable and are, in combination with other agents is quite formidable. Grouping defense is capable of combating all types of aerial targets at all altitudes, the potential air defense group can destroy 800 CBH likely opponent to exhaustion of ammunition missiles and ammunition bespomehovyh in simple terms. The multiplicity of overlapping lesions is 8 – 12, and allows you to: focus fire several complexes (mainly different types) to defeat the most dangerous and important goals include enough forces and air defense weapons in reserve, if necessary, to carry out a maneuver to restore the broken lamp system air defense group, to carry out maneuver fire in the reflection of air strikes. As you can see, the potential for Syria’s air defense system is quite high.With more reliable means of defense covered Mediterranean coastal area of Syria, especially in the maritime ports of Tartus, Baniyas, Latakia. In addition to the existing stationary air defense systems in these areas supposedly deployed recently received on the Syrian air defense air defense system “Buk-M2E”.

Knocked down in the area reconnaissance aircraft flew along the Turkish coast of Syria, of course, to reveal its national defense system, “acquainted” with the emerging new weapons, air defense radars trigger to work in active mode, to identify their location, to detect overt plots in areas of defense, rate capability of the system. Well, to some extent, the spy plane made ​​it. Destruction of the Turkish intelligence showed that the air defense system in Syria is and is able to perform combat missions. however, to talk about her performance in the superb colors, very premature. ZRAP system, as well as other components of the Syrian air defense system is far from perfect. Optimistic picture clouded by the fact that most of the anti-aircraft missile is outdated and does not meet today’s demanding requirements. Weapons and equipment – lots and lots of production of the last century – are unable to resist the highly organized and technically equipped with an air adversary, in the arsenal of the most advanced intelligence systems, controls, fire and electronic countermeasures. main types of air defense system of the old park (S-200, S-75, C-125, “Osa”, “Square”) are vulnerable to passive noise, virtually protected from jamming, no special work in applying the elements of the WTO (PRR, SD ASD).

The experience of local wars and conflicts shows that the enemy will make every effort to reduce air defense group firing capabilities, anti-fire HCC and reduce their effectiveness to a minimum. Practice shows that the air defense system will be the priority targets of when the powerful fire strikes cruise missiles, “radio-electronic shock” will be within 3-4 days suppressed and destroyed intelligence systems, controls, air defense weapon systems. Examples of this abound. In a strong fire and electronic countermeasures capability of the air enemy air defense grouping Syria in the initial period of the war can be reduced by 85-95%. course, the full realization of potential firing capabilities air defense group is problematic and almost impossible. However, by applying a set of measures of organizational and tactical, you can greatly improve the survival of the system, and along with it – and the effectiveness of air defense. First of all it is necessary to carry out institutional arrangements: 1. Particular attention should be paid to the development of guidelines for the early management of fire and interaction, which is essential in the absence of centralized control of combat operations in the shield block SVN. The distribution of the space charge, the determination of the order and sequence of destruction of air targets will effectively implement the interaction between the various independent groups defense during repel attack. 2. Create a mixed group with heterogeneous air defense and SAM ZAK (brigades, regiments, divisions, groups, PVO), applying them to specific tasks covering important sites in different directions. It is important to carefully build a system of fire without failure (including mountainous terrain) in all ranges of heights, especially at low and extremely low altitudes. 3. Samoprikrytiya for use not only MANPADS, ZU-23, ZSU-23-4 “Shilka”, but SAM “Wasp”, “square”, “Armour-S1E” 37mm WGA, WGA 57-mm, 100-mm GFA, especially for samoprikrytiya S-200, S-300P. 4. Create a grouping of air defense duty contained in temporary positions and leading exploration enemy aircraft at frequencies of peace. 5. Build a false fire system with a demonstration of the operation of its mobile work, mobile air defense system. 6. Launch and firing positions thoroughly equipped in engineering terms, to disguise them; false equip and prepare alternate positions 2-3. 7. Possible approaches to the hidden enemy aircraft provide and plan the use of mobile air-defense groups to act as roving and ambushes.

Since the beginning of the active enemy air action appropriate to apply the following recommendations: 1. Divisions C-200, C-300P attract only for the destruction of the most dangerous and the most important goals with the possibility of fire. 2. To focus fire use different types SAM. 3. To restore the disrupted system of fire use mobile air defense system “Buk-M2E” and the S-300P. 4. Limit the operation of RES SAM to radiation, the inclusion of air defense missile systems to radiation carried out only in the presence of the CO with the Communist Party.5. Target shooting to lead to the minimum standards and in the depth of the affected area, the maximum possible loss of air time. Thus, the potential of the system ZRAP quite high, but their implementation in the fight against modern enemy air application requires some effort. The air defense system will show its effect only when the organized use of its components, one of which is the system of fighter cover (SIAP). system Fighter cover Syria has the same problem as all the country’s armed forces. Air Force fighter aircraft consists of four squadrons of MiG-25, four – on MiG-23MLD, armed with four squadrons of MiG-29A. basis fighter aircraft are 48 fighters MiG-29A, upgraded at the turn of the century. 30 interceptor MiG-25 and 80 (other sources say 50) MiG-23MLD are outdated and have limited operational use. Even the most modern of the park represented – the MiG-29 is in need of revision. In addition, the active part of the Air Force has over 150 MiG-21, but their military value is very small. SIAP is the weak point of aerial reconnaissance. In Syria there are no aviation airborne radar – AWACS aircraft and therefore in the event of armed conflict, the Syrian pilots have to rely on ground stations exploration and guidance, also represented outdated fleet.

Effectiveness Fighter cover depends on the number of fighters and combat capabilities, the availability of the number of fighters in various degrees of readiness, capabilities and intelligence systems management on the detection range of SVN, number of sightings and their sustainability in the face of EW, the nature of the enemy air action (height, speed, depth, stroke, type of aircraft, etc.), level of training of flight personnel, time, day, weather conditions and other factors. Designed efficiency fighter cover (the ratio of the number of fighter aircraft destroyed SVN to total EHV participating in a raid in the band (area) liability) is about 6-8%. Of course, this is not enough, especially since even this low efficiency can be achieved only with a high level of preparedness of flight personnel. Thus, the possibility of SIAP to disrupt the combat mission of enemy aircraft are negligible. Potential enemy countries (Israel, Turkey) have a common military-technical superiority over Syria, and in the vast military aviation, command and control systems, communications and intelligence. Air Force of these countries are more numerous, maneuverable, the park of equipment is constantly updated with modern armaments.

In general, the assessment of the Syrian air defense and dual mixed. On the one hand, the air defense group have a large number of samples of diverse anti-aircraft weapons and military equipment. Mixed principle of recruitment of military units to create a multi-layered system of fire over the entire range of heights, providing fire and the defeat of the variety of today’s SVN. Zone defense of important objects (the capital city, major industrial centers, seaports, groups of forces, airfields) can have a 10-12-fold overlapping of destruction and fire different types SAM, SAM systems and ORD.The presence of gangs in the long-range SAM system allows for removal of the affected area on the distant approaches to hide behind objects.System Fighter cover increases the opportunities for air defense to intercept the most dangerous airborne targets over inaccessible to ground-based air defense areas in important areas, etc. The air defense system is strong enough and capable of performing combat missions in both peacetime and in wartime.

Destruction of single aerial targets, the intruder, a reflection of the low density of EHV strikes in the noise of medium intensity – it is harder task for the Syrian air defenses. On the other hand, having composed only 12-15% of modern weapons, air defense system, it is difficult to count on success against the strong, highly organized, equipped with the most modern weapons, systems, weapons control and guidance (primarily high-precision) against an aerial target. Applying a set of organizational, operational-tactical and technical measures can achieve some success in the difficult task of fighting a modern enemy air. However, in the present state of Syria’s air defense system will not be able to resist the combined Air Force coalition of Western states, conducting offensive air operations using several thousand cruise missiles, fighters, bombers, attack helicopters with the mandatory pre-fire and electronic suppression of air defense systems. Syrian air defense desperately needed a radical re- on modern military equipment, a deep modernization of the existing WME models. It is extremely important qualitative training of military personnel, preparing them to conduct air defense battles with technically superior enemy, learning the techniques of anti-aircraft fire (launches of missiles) all kinds of existing anti-aircraft weapons both modern and technology of the last century. Only under these conditions can be expected to succeed in protecting the airspace.What a Face What a Face 

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